We provide a formal model for protocols using ring signatures and prove that this model is computationally sound: if there is an attack in the computational world, then there is an attack in the formal (abstract) model. Our original contribution is that we consider security properties, such as anonymity, which are not properties of a single execution trace, while considering an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol.
Introduction
There are two main approaches to protocol security. The first approach considers an attacker modeled as a probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machine (PPT) and the protocol is an unbounded number of copies of PPTs. The attacker is assumed to control the network and can schedule the communications and send fake messages. The security property is defined as an indistinguishability game: the protocol is secure if, for any attacker A, the probability that A gets an advantage in this game is negligible. A typical example is the anonymity property, by which an attacker should not be able to distinguish between two networks in one of which identities have been switched. The problem with such computational security notions is the difficulty in obtaining detailed proofs: they are in general unmanageable, and cannot be verified by automatic tools.
The second approach relies on a formal model: bitstrings are abstracted by formal expressions (terms), the attacker is any formal process, and security properties, such as anonymity, can be expressed by the observational equivalence of processes. This model is much simpler: there is no coin tossing, no complexity bounds, and the attacker is given only a fixed set of primitive operations (the function symbols in the term algebra). Therefore it is not surprising that security proofs become much simpler and can sometimes be automatized. However, the drawback is that we might miss some attack because the model might be too rough.
Starting with the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway [1] , there have been several results showing the computational soundness of the formal models: we do not miss any attacks when considering the abstract model, provided that the security primitives satisfy certain properties; for instance IND-CPA or IND-CCA in the case of encryption. Such results allow to perform formal symbolic proofs, while yielding computational security guarantees. It is therefore an approach, that is relevant, in principle, to all protocol security proofs.
The present paper is a contribution to this line of research. Until recently, only a few security properties were considered in the soundness results. Roughly speaking, only passive attackers or the properties of execution traces were considered. However, several properties, such as anonymity, cannot be expressed as a property satisfied by all execution traces. Here we consider an active attacker and indistinguishability properties. In [1] , the authors only consider a passive attacker and encryption schemes, while we are considering ring signatures and active intruders: we cannot rely on their results in the present paper.
This problem has been discussed in two recent papers. In [2] , we reported a soundness result for the anonymity of ring signatures. However, we assumed only a fixed number of instances of the protocol, which is a strong simplification. Furthermore, the symbolic model gave quite a lot of power to the attacker and the soundness proof was dedicated to anonymity. In [3] , there are no such restrictions, however the results are limited to symmetric encryption, which does not provide any hint as regards an adequate formal model for ring signatures.
The current paper bridges these two recent studies: we consider a formal model for ring signatures and prove the soundness of observational equivalence for an unbounded number of sessions.
Ring Signatures
The aim of a ring signature is to enable the verification without revealing the signer's identity with a group of signers.
A ring signature scheme RS = (G, S, V) consists of two probabilistic algorithms G and S, and a deterministic algorithm V:
• The key-generation algorithm G, given a security parameter 1 η , outputs a private signing key and a public verification key.
• The signing algorithm S, given a signing key, a set of verification keys and a message, outputs a signature for the message.
• The verification algorithm V, given a set of verification keys, a message, and a signature, outputs 0 or 1.
If a signature is produced by S with keys generated by G, then the verification of the signature always succeeds. We consider two security notions for ring signature schemes: existential unforgeability and basic anonymity [4] . A ring signature scheme RS is existentially unforgeable if a signature cannot be forged without knowing the signing key: for any PPT attacker A having access to an oracle O, the following probability is negligible in η: RS is basically anonymous if the signer of a message cannot be inferred: for any PPT attacker A having access to an oracle O (as above), the following probability is negligible in η:
In addition, we assume unpredictability, which means that no PPT attacker, even with the signing keys, can predict the output of the signing algorithm. Unpredictability is also assumed in the soundness of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs [5] . It is easily obtained by adding extra random bits to signatures.
Symbolic Model
We use a fragment [3] of the applied pi-calculus [6] . Below, we only give the definitions related to ring signatures: for other constructions, refer to [3] .
Terms, predicates and equational theory
The names are split into several disjoint sets:
• identities: K: we confuse the identities and the private signing keys held by those identities.
• random symbols: R
• nonces: N The set T of ground terms is obtained from the names by applying the following function symbols, with some restrictions on the types of their arguments.
• vk(k) constructs a verification key from a signing key k ∈ K,
• u, v is a pair consisting of two terms u, v,
• check(u, VK ) checks the validity of a signature u w.r.t. a set of verification keys
r k,VK constructs a signature for u ∈ T with a signing key k ∈ K, verification keys VK = {vk(k 1 ), . . . , vk(k n )} and randomness r ∈ R; two signature terms with the same random symbol r must be identical,
• RR(u, r) modifies the random number used in a signature u, replacing it with r ∈ R,
• π 1 (u), π 2 (u) retrieve the components of a pair.
These function symbols satisfy certain equations, which we turn into rewrite rules:
This defines an (infinite) convergent term rewriting system on terms. The normal form of u is written as u ↓.
We also introduce predicate symbols that reflect the (maximal) distinguishing capabilities of an attacker:
• M is the well-formedness predicate on ground terms:
M (u) is true if u is in normal form and u does not contain the symbols π 1 , π 2 , check, RR.
• EQ is the strict equality predicate: EQ(u, v) holds if u = v and both terms are well-formed.
• SK is true on pairs of well-formed terms (k, [s] r k,V ): an attacker who knows a signing key can check whether that key is used for signing a given message.
Frames and static equivalence
A frame is a sequence of ground terms in which some names (typically secret keys) n are hidden: φ = νn.u 1 , . . . , u k . We let bn(φ) be n. The frames will record the sequences of messages sent over the network. With each frame φ = νn.s 1 , . . . , s m , we associate a substitution σ φ that replaces the variable x i with s i .
A term s is deducible from a frame φ, which we write as φ ⊢ s, if there is a term u with m variables, not using the names hidden in φ and such that uσ φ ↓= s. This captures the possible attacker's computations on a sequence of messages.
Two frames φ 1 , φ 2 are equivalent, which is written as φ 1 ∼ φ 2 , if, for any terms u, v (with m variables and not using the names hidden by the frames), M (uσ φ1 ↓ ) holds iff M (uσ φ2 ↓) holds and, for P ∈ {EQ, SK}, P (uσ φ1 ↓, vσ φ1 ↓) holds iff P (uσ φ2 ↓, vσ φ2 ↓) holds. In words: when we apply any combination of functions to the two frames, the results always look similar. Examples
since the attacker can only observe an equality between the two signed messages.
[n]
as soon as n = n ′ since, unlike the previous example, n, n ′ are not hidden, and so can be used by the attacker: EQ(check(x, V ), n) holds on the first message and not on the second.
since SK is true on the first sequence and not on the second.
Computation trees, symbolic equivalence
If φ is a frame, we let K(φ) be the set of keys deducible from φ.
A computation tree is a tree whose nodes are labeled with states (out of a set Q) and frames, and the edges are labeled with terms. We write t u − → t ′ if there is an edge labeled with u departing from the root of t and yielding the subtree t ′ . φ(t) is the frame labeling the root of t and q(t) is the state labeling the root of t.
∼ is extended to computation trees: ∼ is the largest equivalence relation on trees such that, if t 1 ∼ t 2 , then
• φ(t 1 ) ∼ φ(t 2 ),
Symbolic equivalence of reduced trees
For each sequence of verification keys, we let the first non-compromised key be its representative. When all subterms [u] r k,VK of a frame φ are such that k is the representative of keys in VK , we say that φ is reduced. A computation tree is reduced if all the frames labeling its nodes are reduced.
Let ≃ be the equivalence relation on frames defined by: νn 1 .u 1 ≃ νn 2 .u 2 iff there are renamings ρ 1 of n 1 and ρ 2 of n 2 such that ρ 1 (u 1 ) = ρ 2 (u 2 ). ≃ is extended to computation trees in the same way as ∼ was extended.
Lemma 1 Let t 1 , t 2 be two reduced computation trees. Then t 1 ∼ t 2 iff t 1 ≃ t 2 .
Processes
A protocol is specified as a simple process, which is a parallel composition of processes that repeatedly receive a message, test it, and send messages. Each test is specified by a conjunction of atomic predicates. Each message is assumed to include its intended recipient.
Each process P in the calculus can be associated with a computation tree t P that records all possible interactions with the network: labels of edges are messages from the attacker and nodes are labeled with the state of the network and the record of messages that have already been sent.
Computational Interpretation

Computational interpretation of terms
Given a security parameter η and an interpretation τ of names as bitstrings, a computational interpretation
τ η of each term t is defined as in [3] . We assume that the interpretation of a ring signature [u] 
We also assume that verification keys come with a certificate: the attacker cannot generate such keys oneself and must get them from an authority.
Computational indistinguishability of computation
trees Given a security parameter η and an interpretation τ of names as bitstrings, we assume that there is a total injective parsing function κ Given a computation tree t and an assignment τ of names to bitstrings, the oracle O t,τ is defined as follows:
• When queried for the first time with a bitstring m,
• If there is no edge labeled with κ τ η (m) and departing from the root of t, it returns an error message.
• After the first query, it behaves as O t ′ ,τ . t 1 and t 2 are computationally indistinguishable, which we write as t 1 ≈ t 2 , if, for any PPT A O ,
is negligible in the security parameter η.
Tree soundness
We consider trees without dynamic corruption. In such a tree t, if ψ is labeling any node of t, we assume that K(ψ) = K(φ(t)): corrupted keys are identical along all branches of the tree.
Given a frame φ and a term u, Ψ VK ,φ (u) is the term obtained by replacing signatures [s]
Ψ VK is the function that maps each frame φ to the frame in which all subterms u of φ are replaced with Ψ VK ,φ (u).
Ψ VK is extended to computation trees as follows: φ(Ψ VK (t)) = Ψ VK (φ(t)), q(Ψ VK (t)) = q(t) and, if
Note that all labels of edges departing from a node in Ψ VK (t) are distinct, as soon as it is the case for t, because different random symbols must be used for different signatures.
Lemma 2 For any computation tree t without dynamic corruption, and any set of verification keys VK , Ψ VK (t) ∼ t.
Lemma 4 Assuming basic anonymity, t ≈ Ψ VK (t).
For this crucial lemma, we need to build a machine B, which breaks the basic anonymity, from a machine A that distinguishes t and Ψ VK (t). Roughly speaking, B will simulate the network, keeping the state in its memory, and behave as A: when A sends a query m,B parses m, computes the next state and obtains the symbolic reply u. Then B computes [[u] ] τ η , possibly sending requests to the signing oracle. When such a request would yield different answers depending on whether A interacts with t or Ψ VK (t), then B requests a signed message and guesses the signer according to the guess of A.
Lemma 5 (Tree soundness for ring signatures) Assuming basic anonymity, if t, t ′ are computation trees without dynamic corruption such that t ∼ t ′ , then t ≈ t ′ .
Proof sketch We successively apply Ψ VK to all sets of verification keys VK occurring in the tree and apply Lemmas 1-4.
(QED)
Trace mapping
We assume here that there is no occurrence of RR or SK in the protocol and that M can be implemented in PTIME. For any simple process P , security parameter η and random tape τ , We show that message sequences of
τ η are fully abstracted by some path of t P , with an overwhelming probability. First we identify the cases in which a computational trace cannot be fully abstracted:
Lemma 6 Let P be a simple process, A a PPT attacker, η a security parameter and τ a random tape. Then either of the following conditions holds: • There are a name k occurring in P and a term u occurring as a subterm in κ Lemma 7 Assume unforgeability and unpredictability. Let P be a simple process, t its process computation tree, and A a PPT attacker. With an overwhelming probability over all samples τ , there is a path p in t that fully abstracts the computational message sequence of A [[P ]] τ η . Proof sketch Assume that the probability is not overwhelming. One of the cases, except the first one, in the previous lemma is true with a non-negligible probability. For each of the cases, we can construct a PPT attacker that breaks either unforgeability or unpredictability by simulating [[P ]] τ η and calling A as a subroutine.
Soundness of Observational Equivalence
The anonymity of a protocol is specified by the equivalence between, for example, two simple processes P 0 (k 0 ) P 1 (k 1 ) and P 0 (k 1 ) P 1 (k 0 ) where k 0 and k 1 are the identities (signing keys) of two agents. (We omit the details of how we publish vk(k 0 ) and vk(k 1 ).) The symbolic anonymity P 0 (k 0 ) P 1 (k 1 ) ∼ P 0 (k 1 ) P 1 (k 0 ), implies the computational anonymity [[P 0 (k 0 ) P 1 (k 1 )]] ≈ [[P 0 (k 1 ) P 1 (k 0 )]] thanks to the soundness theorem below.
Theorem 1 Assume basic anonymity, unforgeability and unpredictability. Let P and Q be simple processes and A be a PPT attacker. If P ∼ Q, then
Proof sketch As shown in [3] , P ∼ Q implies t P ∼ t Q . Then t P ≈ t Q follows from Lemma 5. (QED)
